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This paper uses opinion surveys to document discontent with the pro-market reforms
implemented by most Latin American countries during the 1990s. The paper also explores
four possible sets of explanations for this discontent:  (i) a general drift of the populace’s
political views to the left; (ii) an increase in political activism by those who oppose reforms;
(iii) a decline in the people’s trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis. The
paper’s principal finding is that the macroeconomic situation plays an important role in
explaining the dissatisfaction with the reform process.
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I. Introduction
There is by now a large body of literature that describes and discusses the
discontent with the pro-market reforms commonly referred to as the
“Washington Consensus” (Williamson, 1990), and often associated with the
process of “Globalization” (for a survey, see Lora and Panizza, 2003; and
Stiglitz, 2002). The objective of this paper is to use opinion polls to document
Latin Americans’ increasing discontent with those reforms and to explore
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possible explanations for this trend. We evaluate four possible explanations
for this dissatisfaction. The first focuses on a change in political orientation.
The second focuses on a change in political activism on the part of those who
oppose reforms. The third focuses on trust in political actors. The fourth
focuses on the economic situation. There is also an important set of
explanations for discontent with reforms that we do not consider in this paper.
This set of explanations focuses on the role of cognitive biases in the formation
of public opinion. An interesting paper by Pernice and Sturzenegger (2003)
studies the case of Argentina and uses cognitive bias (especially confirmatory
and self-serving biases) to explain rejection of reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes some indicators
aimed at measuring support for pro-market reforms and describes their
evolution over time. It also describes the demographics of those who support
and oppose reforms. Section III explores possible explanations for discontent
with the reform process. Section IV concludes.
II. What Do Latin Americans Think of Reforms?
The purpose of this section is to gauge the attitude of Latin Americans
toward pro-market reforms. In order to do so, we use individual-level data
from the Latinobarómetro annual surveys. This data set covers 17 Latin
American countries over a period of 7 years (1996-2003) and consists of an
average of 1,200 respondents per country-year.1 A Latinobarómetro survey
was conducted in 1995, but we have excluded it because it covers a smaller
set of countries. Data for the 2002 survey were not made available to us and
hence are not included in the analysis.  National polling firms in each individual
country conduct the surveys, so the sampling method from country to country
varies slightly. However, in most cases the selection includes some quotas to
ensure representation across gender, socio-economic status, and age.
Although the Latinobarómetro data offer an unprecedented wealth of
information, some problems with the survey do exist. The first is that the
1 The surveyed countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay,
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Latinobarómetro survey initially focused exclusively on the urban population.
While most of the recent surveys have national coverage and samples
representing the whole population, in Chile, Colombia and Paraguay the
coverage is only urban (the urban populations are 70 percent, 51 percent, and
30 percent of the total population). Second, until 2002, the surveys were
conducted using only the country’s official language (Spanish or Portuguese);
consequently, were not representative of the attitudes of those portions of the
indigenous population that are not fluent in the official language.  Moreover,
there is some evidence that, at least in the early years, the pool of survey
respondents over-represented individuals with relatively high levels of
education (Gaviria, Panizza, and Seddon, 2004). Finally, the survey does not
ask directly about pro-market reforms. Therefore, while it would be most
desirable to have a set of variables that directly measure Latin Americans’
opinion toward pro-market reforms, we must use the available variables to
build several indicators to serve as a reasonable proxy. The reader should
keep in mind that some of our variables better proxy opinions toward reforms
while others better proxy opinions toward market economy.2
Our preferred variable is PRIVAT (available for 1998, 2000, 2001, and
2003) which takes value one if the respondent thinks that the privatization
process benefited the country and zero otherwise. Among our variables, this
is probably the most accurate measure of opinion of one type of reform that
was prevalent in most Latin American countries. A second set of variables
measures the general attitude toward the market economy. MARKET
(available for 1998 and 2000) takes value one if the respondent thinks that a
market economy is good for the country and zero otherwise. PRICES (available
for 1998, 2000, and 2001) takes a value of one if the respondent thinks that
prices should be set by the market and zero if prices should be decided by
some central authority. PRIVPROD (available for 1998 and 2001) takes a
value of one if the respondent thinks that productive activity should be left to
the private sector and zero otherwise. It should be clear that MARKET,
PRICES and PRIVPROD are direct measures of the public’s attitude toward
a market economy . They can be used as a proxy for Latin Americans’ position
2 Table A1 provides the detailed information about the questions used to build the variables.4 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
toward reforms only by assuming that the main aim of the structural reform
process was liberalizing the economy. We do not find such an assumption
unrealistic. In fact, five of the ten original points in Williamson’s (1990)
“Washington Consensus” focused on expanding the role of the market
economy.
The third set of indicators deals with attitudes towards international trade
and foreign direct investment. LACINT (available for 1996, 1997, 1998, and
2001) is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if the respondent
holds a favorable view of economic integration in Latin America and a value
of zero if the respondent is against the integration process. This is probably
the most problematic variable. As individuals who are against economic
reforms and free trade in general might still favor Latin American integration,
it is a very imperfect proxy of attitudes toward free trade (which, ideally, is
what we want to measure). In fact, Table A2 in the Appendix shows a very
low correlation of LACINT with most of the other variables used in this paper.3
Therefore, all results concerning LACINT should be interpreted with some
caution.
FDI takes value one if the respondent thinks that foreign direct investment
is beneficial for the country and zero if foreign direct investment is harmful.
We think that FDI is a good measure of at least one aspect of the reforms
process (i.e., opening the economy to foreign investors). The main problem
with this variable is that it is only available for one year (1998), thus it is
impossible to track its evolution over time.
Table 1 summarizes the average values of the five variables mentioned
above. The most striking number is the large drop in support for privatization
(FDI has no time variation). In 1998, more than 50 percent of Latin Americans
thought that privatization was beneficial for their country. This percentage
dropped to 31 percent in 2001 and to 25 percent in 2003. We observe a similar
trend for MARKET. In 1998, 77 percent of Latin Americans thought that a
market economy was good for the country. In 2000, the percentage supporting
3 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out and suggesting that
“Latin American integration is throughout the Region a value cherished by all kinds of
leftists and nationalists who oppose economic reforms.”5 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
Table 1. What Do Latin Americans Think of Pro-Market Reforms?
LACINT FDI PRIVAT MARKET PRICES PRIVPROD
1996 0.74 --- --- --- --- ---
1997 0.87 --- --- --- --- ---
1998 0.88 0.77 0.52 0.77 0.63 0.56
2000 --- --- 0.38 0.67 0.57 ---
2001 0.84 --- 0.31 --- 0.59 0.50
2003 --- --- 0.25 --- --- ---
Note: The values reported in the table measure the share of respondents that support  Latin
American economic integration, FDI, privatization, market economy, price liberalization
and private production.
a market economy dropped to 67 percent.4 Support for private production
and market prices also dropped, but by a smaller amount, and there was no
change in support for economic integration in Latin America. Table A2 in the
Appendix shows that the correlation between these variables, while positive
and statistically significant, is rather low, which indicates that the different
questions do in fact capture different aspects of attitudes toward pro-market
reforms.
It is worth mentioning that, while over the period that goes from 1985 to
1995 most Latin American countries implemented extensive pro-market
reforms, the reform process has not been homogenous across countries and
across types of reforms (Lora and Panizza, 2003; and Lora and Olivera,
2004a,b). Although these considerations suggest that it may be misleading to
talk of Latin America as a homogenous entity, it is worth mentioning that the
4 Unfortunately, a change in the questionnaire made it impossible to look at the behavior of
this question in 2003. The surveys from 1998 and 2000 asked: “Do you think that a market
economy is good for the country?” For the year 2003, the question was: “Are you satisfied
with the functioning of the market economy?” Only 18 percent of respondents gave an
affirmative answer to this question. Notice that the evolution of the various indicators is
not driven by the extreme behavior of Argentina. We obtain similar results even after
dropping Argentina from the sample. For instance, support for privatization would go
from 52 percent (in 1998) to 26 percent (in 2003).6 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS


















Figure 1. Support for Privatization*
Note: *Share of respondents who think that privatizations have been beneficial for the
country.
drop in support for privatization was general. As Figure 1 shows, in ten out of
sixteen countries in 1998, more than 50 percent of survey respondents supported
privatization. In 2003, there was no country in which a majority of the
population supported privatization. Support for privatization in 2003 ranged
from 37 percent (in Brazil) to just above 10 percent (in Argentina and Panama).
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Paraguay are the
countries where support for privatization dropped by the largest amount.
Before attempting to explain the drop in support for pro-market reforms and
the market economy, it is interesting to look at the demographics of those who
support and oppose reforms. We do so by running a set of regressions in which
the dependent variables are the different indicators used to measure attitude
toward reforms and the explanatory variables include a set of demographic and
socio-economic  variables  that  include  respondents’  age,  sex,  education,
wealth, socioeconomic  status  and  happiness/optimism  (Table 2).  To  make
the  results more  intuitive, regressions were estimated using  a  linear7 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
Table 2. Attitude Toward Reforms by Socioeconomic Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LACINT FDI PRIVAT MARKET PRICES PRIVPROD
HAPPY 12.047 18.066 32.227 22.978 15.570 7.591
(5.02) *** (2.60) ** (9.75) *** (4.55) *** (4.17) *** (1.78) *
AGE 0.085 0.128 -0.194 -0.008 0.017 0.472
(0.89) (0.65) (2.02) * (0.09) (0.15) (3.19) ***
AGE2 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.004
(0.33) (0.56) (1.59) (0.58) (0.37) (2.72) **
SEX -1.201 -5.366 -1.615 -1.667 -3.899 -4.091
(3.00) *** (4.10) *** (3.10) *** (3.75) *** (4.92) *** (4.56) ***
quintile==2 1.745 3.128 -1.314 -1.457 -0.333 -0.612
(2.34) ** (1.98) * (2.06) * (1.24) (0.36) (0.59)
quintile==3 3.256 4.328 -0.978 0.945 1.682 0.307
(5.18) *** (2.59) ** (0.97) (0.62) (1.83) * (0.20)
quintile==4 3.452 7.502 -0.632 0.346 2.464 1.574
(3.99) *** (3.10) *** (0.71) (0.26) (2.91) ** (1.07)
quintile==5 4.023 10.291 2.568 2.676 4.810 5.039
(4.54) *** (5.64) *** (2.11) * (1.80) * (3.30) *** (2.62) **
EDUCA==2 1.622 1.651 -2.560 2.562 1.971 -0.395
(1.38) (0.62) (1.88) * (0.98) (1.49) (0.19)
EDUCA==3 3.283 4.896 -3.529 2.351 2.036 -1.427
(2.61) ** (2.04) * (2.12) * (1.17) (1.16) (0.58)
EDUCA==4 4.625 6.024 -4.666 3.392 2.234 -1.359
(3.57) *** (2.90) ** (2.92) ** (1.63) (1.83) * (0.64)
EDUCA==5 5.295 8.026 -3.546 3.708 3.116 -1.920
(3.74) *** (3.63) *** (1.92) * (1.41) (2.20) ** (0.72)
EDUCA==6 7.644 8.956 -2.772 1.274 2.244 -2.201
(6.21) *** (3.57) *** (1.51) (0.48) (1.21) (0.87)
EDUCA==7 7.289 10.921 0.526 2.726 3.343 1.145
(5.26) *** (4.40) *** (0.25) (1.08) (1.77) * (0.47)
SOC_EC==1 1.027 1.598 -1.437 -0.557 -1.786 -0.006
(1.00) (0.75) (1.08) (0.32) (1.49) (0.00)8 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
SOC_EC==2 1.949 0.400 -1.437 1.381 -1.375 -2.004
(1.54) (0.19) (1.22) (0.62) (1.23) (0.94)
SOC_EC==3 3.021 -0.655 -0.712 2.295 -0.626 -1.447
(2.11) * (0.22) (0.53) (0.92) (0.47) (0.71)
SOC_EC==4 3.555 2.571 2.049 3.191 1.673 2.366
(1.98) * (0.87) (1.28) (0.88) (1.27) (1.03)
Constant 69.614 47.351 37.726 49.178 58.990 40.082
(25.04) *** (7.23) *** (12.97) *** (11.45) *** (20.75) *** (7.89) ***
Observations 55080 11508 60721 26207 44110 28010
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.04
Notes: All the equations are estimated using a linear probability model and include country-
year fixed effects and country-year clustered standard errors. Robust t statistics in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Education is
proxied with 7 dummies variables: 1 indicates illiterate, 2 indicates some primary, 3 indicates
completed primary, 4 indicates some secondary, 5 indicates completed secondary, 6 indicates
some university, and 7 indicates completed university.  Illiterate is the excluded dummy.
The wealth quintiles (quintile) were built as the principal component of several indicators
of asset ownership. The variable measuring happiness/optimism (HAPPY) was built as the
principal component of three questions focusing on whether the respondent is satisfied
with his/her life and on how he/she evaluates his/her current and future economic situation.
The SEX variable takes value 0 for men and value 1 for women. More details are provided
in Table A1.
Table 2. (Continued) Attitude Toward Reforms By Socioeconomic
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LACINT FDI PRIVAT MARKET PRICES PRIVPROD
probability  model.5 All regressions include country-fixed effects and country-
specific time effects, and the standard errors are clustered by country-year.
In all cases, we find that men tend to be more supportive of pro-market
reforms than women. The difference ranges from one percentage point in the
case of LACINT to five percentage points in the case of FDI. The estimations
5 Probit estimations (available upon request) yield similar results.9 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
suggest that there is a positive correlation between happiness/optimism (as
measured by the variable HAPPY) and support for reform and free markets.
Quantitatively, the effect of happiness is very important. An individual who
claims to be very happy (HAPPY = 1) is between 8 and 32 percentage points
more likely to support reforms than an individual who claims to be very
unhappy (HAPPY = 0). In the case of privatization, a one standard deviation
increase in happiness (equivalent to 0.16 points in the happiness index) is
associated to a 5.15 percentage point increase in support for privatization. No
other respondent-specific variable has a quantitatively similar effect on support
for reform.
We also find that support for economic integration (measured by LACINT
and FDI) increases with wealth and education. The effect of education is
particularly strong for LACINT and FDI.6 In the case of PRIVAT, we find
that wealth is rarely statistically significant and that individuals with
intermediate levels of education are strongly opposed to privatization. The
coefficient of education in the PRIVAT variable is almost always negative;
the only exception is for individuals who have completed university. Education
is positively correlated with MARKET and PRICES and negatively correlated
with PRIVPROD, but the coefficients are rarely statistically significant.
Wealth, instead, is positively correlated with these variables. In particular,
the regressions indicate that individuals belonging to the top quintile of the
wealth distribution show a strong support for the market economy, liberalized
prices, and private production.
Finally, the regressions also include a variable measuring the respondent’s
socio-economic status (SOC_EC measures socio economic status as judged
by the interviewer, a higher value indicates higher socio-economic status).
This variable is never statistically significant.
6 This is an interesting finding, because, according to standard trade theory, it is the relatively
abundant factor of production (unskilled labor, in the case of Latin America) that is likely
to receive the greatest benefit from economic integration. However, it bears repeating that
LACINT might be a poor proxy for the public’s overall attitude towards free trade. An
alternative explanation is that, in the case of Latin America, skilled workers (rather than
unskilled) benefited more from trade and capital account liberalization (we would like to
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out).10 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
III. Reasons for the Discontent
The purpose of this section is to analyze possible explanations of the
discontent with the reform process. While there is extensive literature studying
the factors that drive the reform process and reform reversals, most of the
models emphasized in this literature are based on the behavior of political
parties and interest groups. To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal
model to analyze a sudden opinion change among the majority of a country’s
residents. Therefore, rather than basing our analysis on a formal model, we
list a series of hypotheses which are often put forward in policy circles and
analyze whether any of these hypotheses can explain the trends documented
in the previous section. In particular, we analyze four possible explanations:
(i) an overall movement of the population’s politics to the left; (ii) an increase
in political activism among reform opponents; (iii) a decline in the public’s
trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis.
A. Have Latin Americans Moved to the Left?
One possible cause for the decrease in support for pro-market reforms
might be a general movement of the Latin American population toward the
political left. This could be part of a global trend generated by the end of the
Reagan-Thatcher era and the beginning of a worldwide movement toward
the left following, with a lag, the leadership of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.
Latinobarómetro permits the investigation of this hypothesis because it
includes a question about the respondents’ political orientation. The question
asks: “On a scale of 0 to 10, how right wing are you?” with 0 being the
farthest left and 10 the farthest right. Figure 2 shows the average values for
all Latin American countries included in Latinobarómetro for 1996, 1998,
2001, and 2003. Each bar presents the share of respondents that declared
themselves in a given position on the political scale in a given year. The data
suggest that there has been no net change in political orientation which, if
anything, shows a small movement to the right.
If we focus on the behavior of extremists (left-wing extremists are defined
as those that chose values 0 or 1, and right-wing extremists are defined as
those who chose 9 or 10), we find that most Central American and Andean11 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
countries are characterized by a large share of right-wing extremists.
Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, and Brazil are the most polarized countries,
with a significant segment of the population defining themselves as either
right-wing or left-wing extremist.7 At the same time, Argentina, Bolivia, and
Chile are the countries with the smallest share of extremists. While these
cross-country differences could be due to the fact that the definition of being
right-wing is country-specific,8 what is most important for our purposes is
the relative stability of political opinion, which provides prima facie evidence
that Latin Americans have not moved toward the political left.
To further probe the hypothesis that changes in political attitude drive
changes in attitudes for economic reforms, we augment the regressions of
Table 2 with a variable that measures political orientation (Table 3). To this
purpose, we generated four dummies measuring political orientation. The
7 Detailed results are available upon request.
8 Alesina and Glaeser (2004) discuss the reasons behind Europeans and Americans’ differing
attitudes towards redistribution. Their work suggests that individuals who classify themselves
as liberal (i.e., left wing) in the U.S. have views on redistribution that would classify them
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Figure 2. Political Orientation in Latin America
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Table 3. Attitude Toward Reforms By Socioeconomic Characteristics and
Political Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LACINT FDI PRIVAT MARKET PRICES PRIVPROD
LEFT -3.825 -2.790 -3.915 -3.653 -4.748 -3.994
(2.51) ** (2.05) * (1.69) (2.09) * (3.10) *** (1.63)
CEN_LEFT -1.217 -3.867 -2.663 -4.101 -1.725 -1.263
(1.44) (2.60) ** (1.31) (2.57) ** (1.11) (0.54)
CEN_RIGHT -0.467 1.034 5.061 3.538 3.304 3.737
(0.78) (0.72) (2.57) ** (3.15) *** (3.05) *** (1.33)
RIGHT -1.879 -3.701 2.477 2.149 -0.002 -3.584
(2.02) * (2.23) ** (1.07) (1.38) (0.00) (1.20)
CL_EL 3.693 6.895 5.200 2.991 4.277 3.373
(2.98) *** (3.43) *** (3.09) *** (2.38) ** (3.40) *** (1.43)
CONN 0.803 -0.065 0.233 1.581 1.013 3.575
(1.63) (0.09) (0.31) (3.58) *** (1.36) (3.09) ***
CORR 3.892 3.282 -1.853 0.560 -1.863 -3.033
(3.41) *** (2.52) ** (1.07) (0.46) (2.46) ** (2.40) **
Constant 65.933 34.269 8.428 44.335 55.448 46.529
(16.23) *** (4.64) *** (1.24) (8.71) *** (10.34) *** (4.49) ***
Observations 19,046 8,145 20,512 19,381 20,294 8,257
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: All the equations are estimated using a linear probability model and include country-
year fixed effects and country-year clustered standard errors. The regressions also include
all the controls included in Table 2. The coefficients of these variables are not reported to
save space. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
first (LEFT) takes value one for left-wing extremists (i.e. those who answered
0 or 1); the second (CENLEFT) takes value one for those who are left-center
(answered 2, 3, or 4); the third (CENRIGHT) takes value one for those who
are right-center (answered 6, 7, or 8); and the fourth (RIGHT) takes value
one for right-wing extremists (answered 9 or 10). CENTER is the excluded13 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
dummy and is the variable against which the coefficient of the previous
variables should be compared.9
Column 1 shows that support for Latin American integration reaches a
maximum at the center of the political spectrum. Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 show
that in the cases of FDI, PRIVAT, MARKET, and PRICES, support is
maximized among center-right individuals. In all cases individuals on the left
support reforms less than individuals in the center of the political spectrum
(the coefficient for LEFT is always negative and is statistically significant in
4 out of 6 regressions).
To quantify the possible impact of political preference on support for
reforms, consider column 3 of Table 3 and assume that in the initial period,
100 percent of the population belongs to the center right group and in the
final period, 100 percent of the population belongs to the extreme left. Such
a massive and clearly unrealistic switch in political preferences could explain
a 9 percentage point drop in support for privatization, or about one third of
the observed drop. While this is a sizable shift in support for privatization, we
were able to obtain such a number only by making a very strong assumption
about the switch in political preferences. However, we have already
documented that, in the period under observation, there was no switch in
political orientation and clearly no movement toward the left. This leads us to
conclude that there is no evidence to link the dissatisfaction with reforms to a
change in political orientation among the population.
The regressions of Table 3 also control for three variables that test whether
the respondent feels that: (i) elections are clean (CL_EL); (ii) success in life
is due to hard work rather than connections (CONN); and (iii) corruption is
an important problem (CORR). We find a positive correlation between the
perceived fairness of the political system and support for reform. Those who
think that elections are clean are between 3 and 7 percentage points more
likely to be in favor of economic integration, privatization and the free market.
This is an important finding because it may mean that a clean and well-
functioning democratic system could make the reform process more
9A previous version of the paper included 10 dummies measuring all possible answers to
the question, “How right wing are you?” A referee suggested that reducing the number of
dummies would increase the readability of the results.14 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
sustainable. This finding is not surprising, there is a long literature going
back to the work of Douglass North that has emphasized the link between the
quality of institutions and economic growth (recent empirical tests of this
hypothesis include Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2000; and Rodrik
et al., 2002; for a contrarian view, see Glaeser et al., 2004).10 We also find
that those who think that hard work is more important than connections tend
to be more supportive of free market and private production. However, this
variable is not statistically significant in the equations for LACINT, FDI,
PRIVAT, and PRICES.
Interestingly, we find that those who regard corruption as a serious problem
are more supportive of economic openness (they support economic integration
and think that FDI is beneficial for the country) and less supportive of price
liberalization and private production (they are also less supportive of
privatization, but the coefficient is not statistically significant). One possible
interpretation for the first result (positive correlation between perception of
corruption and economic openness) is that survey respondents may believe
that increasing openness will help reduce corruption. This is in line with the
findings of Ades and Di Tella (1999).11 A possible interpretation for the second
result (negative correlation between perception of corruption and support for
liberalized prices, private production, and privatization) is that those who
believe corruption is a serious problem may be more skeptical of free markets
because they suspect powerful interest groups would capture all the benefits
of economic liberalization.
There is also the possibility that, in the respondent’s mind, the perception
of corruption proxies for some other factor. For instance, Di Tella and
MacCulloch (2004) suggest that those who express typically left wing positions
also tend to report more corruption. A possible interpretation of this finding
is that respondents might confuse corruption with what they deem to be social
injustice. If this were the case, the answer to the corruption question might
10 However, this could also mean that those who benefit from reforms are the same as those
who benefit from an electoral system that does not work well, but that, in their opinion, is
fair and clean.
11 Clearly, this is no more than one possible interpretation, which we are unable to test
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proxy for individual political orientation. However, because the regressions
control for political orientation, we believe that the correlation between
perception of corruption and support for market reforms is additional to the
correlation between political orientation and support for reforms.
B. Those Who Oppose Reforms Have Become More Vocal
Another possible explanation for the rejection of reforms could be that,
following the worldwide resonance of anti-globalization protests during the
Seattle WTO meetings and events like the World Social Forum, opponents of
pro-market reforms have promoted their cause more vocally and effectively.
This hypothesis would require: (i) a correlation between support (or opposition
to) for reform and participation in political or protest activities, and (ii) a
change in the level of participation in political or protest activities.
We start by checking for differences in political participation between
supporters of and opponents of reforms. We find that those who support
reforms are more interested in politics than those who oppose reforms (but
the correlation is rather weak). Next, we check whether interest in politics
has changed during the period under observation and find no evidence in
support of this hypothesis. In particular, we find that interest in politics has
remained constant over the 1996-2003 period.
Next, we move beyond pure interest in politics and build an index of
support for violent political activities.12 We find that those who oppose reforms
are between 1 and 2.5 percentage points (corresponding to a 10 percent
difference) more likely to support violent political activities.13 While this
finding lends support to the idea that reform opponents tend to “make more
noise,” we find no evidence that support for violent political activities has
increased over time. Therefore, the correlation between support for violent
political activities and opposition to reforms cannot explain the current
rejection of reforms.
12 The index ranges from 0 to 1 and is built as the principal component of a set of questions
that ask whether the individual has ever participated or would participate in violent
demonstrations, occupations, lootings, etc.
13 Results available upon request.16 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
C. Trust in Public Institutions and Political Parties Has Declined
Another possible explanation for Latin American discontent toward
reforms is a decline in trust of political parties and/or the elites that promoted
the reform process. Economic development scholars reckon that political
parties may be important in the reform process because of their programmatic
orientation and because they may facilitate the process of aggregating disparate
views in order to arrive at compromises that allow for the adoption of reforms
(Boix and Posner, 1998; Corrales, 2002; and Graham et al., 1999). Moreover,
political parties may also play an important role in the sustainability of reforms
because they can shield the reforms from interest group pressures. Reforms
are therefore more susceptible to losing the support of public opinion in
countries where confidence in political parties is low.
Of course, if we were to find any support for this hypothesis, then we
would have the difficult task of explaining why trust in political parties has
decreased over time. It is nonetheless interesting to look at whether there is a
relationship between support for reforms and trust in political parties. We
measure trust in and identification with political parties by using two different
variables. The first, CONFIPP (available for 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001,
and 2003) measures the level of trust in political parties, taking a value of 4 if
the respondent has a great deal of trust in political parties and 1 if the
respondent does not trust political parties. The second, IDENTPP (available
for 1996, 1997, and 2003) measures respondents’ identification with political
parties, with values ranging from 1 if the respondent feels little or no
identification with political parties to 4 if the respondent feels very identified
with political parties.
The first two columns of Table 4 summarize the data and show a small
decline in trust in political parties and identification with political parties.
The first four columns of Table 5 show that there is a strong and positive
correlation between support for reforms and trust in political parties.14The
results indicate that an individual who fully trusts political parties is 1.4
14 In Table 5 we include one trust or confidence variable at a time to give these variables the
maximum chance to explain the phenomenon at hand. We do not report regressions using
IDENTPP and TR_CON because the results are even less significant.17 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
Table 4. Trust in Political Parties, the Congress, and the President
CONFIPPa IDENTPPa TR_CONb TR_PRESb
1996 1.87 1.66 2.96 2.96
1997 2.04 1.75 2.78 2.70
1998 1.84 --- 2.98 2.77
2000 1.77 --- 3.01 2.75
2001 1.78 --- 3.08 2.96
2003 1.50 1.55 3.32 3.01
Notes: a a higher value means more trust; b a higher value means less trust.
percentage points more likely to support a market economy than an individual
who does not trust political parties (and 5 percentage points more likely to
support privatization). However, when we multiply the coefficient obtained
in column 4 (5.07) with the maximum change in trust of political parties
(2.04 - 1.50 = 0.54), we obtain a value of 2.7 percentage points. This indicates
that changes in support for political parties can only explain a minuscule
share of the change in support for privatization (which dropped by almost 30
percentage points).
The last two columns of Table 4 look at the evolution of trust in the national
congress (TR_CON) and the president (TR_PRES). As in the case of support
for political parties, we find that support for the president and the congress
has declined slightly, but not by an amount sufficient to explain fully the
decline in support of reforms. The last four columns of  Table 5 show that
those who trust the president tend to be more supportive of the market economy.
However, even if we focus on the regression with the highest coefficient
(column 8, -6.03) and multiply this coefficient with the largest observed change
in support for the president (0.31, from 1997 to 2003), we obtain 1.9. This
implies that change in support for the president can explain a 2 percent drop
in support for the privatization. Again, this indicates that the fact that people
who trust the president tend to be more supportive of reforms does not help to






























Table 5. Confidence, Identification with Political Parties and Support for Reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LACINT MARKET PRICES PRIVAT LACINT MARKET PRICES PRIVAT
CONFIPP 1.255 1.363 1.966 5.073
(3.03) *** (2.51) ** (4.36) *** (9.48) ***
TR_PRES -2.750 -4.268 -3.060 -6.036
(5.64) *** (5.30) *** (5.65) *** (8.06) ***
Constant 74.617 62.172 76.643 17.417 85.358 74.969 90.268 38.191
(31.73) *** (17.35) *** (29.64) *** (9.42) *** (32.51) *** (17.65) *** (26.09) *** (13.76) ***
Obs. 53,813 25,519 43,115 59,507 54,007 25,625 43,274 59,667
R-squared          0.07     0.04                  0.04         0.09          0.07            0.05            0.05                0.10
Notes: All the equations are estimated using a linear probability model and include country-year fixed effects and country-year clustered standard
errors. The regressions also include all the controls in Table 2. The coefficients of these variables are not reported to  save space. Robust t statistics
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.19 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
D. Is it the Economy?
The final possible explanation can be summarized by the famous slogan:
“It’s the economy, stupid!”
Table  6  shows  the   recent  behavior of four macroeconomic variables:
(i) the output gap (computed as the log deviation of actual GDP from trend






 and (iv) the depth of economic crisis (obtained by multiplying
the output gap by minus one and setting economic expansion equal to zero).
Table 6 shows that the macroeconomic situation deteriorated on all fronts
with the exception of inflation. The output gap went from positive to negative
in 2002 (Argentina, with an output gap of around -14 percent, played an
important role in determining this outcome), average unemployment increased
by 3 percentage points, and economic crises became deeper and more
prevalent.
Table 7 looks at how macroeconomic variables affect opinion toward
reforms. Our main focus is on the relationship between macroeconomic
15 Trend GDP is calculated by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to real GDP (in local
currency) for the 1980-2002 period.
Table 6. Macroeconomic Variables
      GDP GAP       Unemployment          Inflation  Depth of crisis
Average SD Average SD Average SD Average SD
1994 2.04 1.99 7.49 2.68 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.17
1995 1.21 2.99 8.62 3.98 0.17 0.11 0.70 1.62
1996 1.37 2.42 9.64 4.10 0.15 0.11 0.46 1.08
1997 3.16 2.76 8.97 3.60 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.43
1999 0.37 3.27 10.38 4.45 0.08 0.09 1.26 1.84
2000 0.44 2.59 10.02 4.64 0.09 0.11 0.83 1.44
2002 -3.35 5.04 10.76 4.25 0.07 0.06 3.90 4.2720 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
variables and support for privatization, but we also test whether our results
are robust to using support for the market economy. The choice of PRIVAT
as our main dependent variable seems natural because this is the variable that
best maps one specific aspect of structural reforms. MARKET is also an
interesting variable because it measures the general attitude toward the market
economy and hence captures the ultimate objective of the Washington
Consensus reforms. We do not use FDI because it does not have time variation
and do not use LACINT because, as mentioned in section II, this is a very
imprecise measure of support for free trade.16
Besides the standard set of control variables used in Table 2 (except
education; including education does not affect the results), we now include
three of the macroeconomic variables of Table 6 lagged one year.17 Most
coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected sign (positive
for output gap and negative for other variables). Inflation enters the regression
with a positive sign (statistically significant when unemployment, inflation
and output gap are entered in the same regression). We do not have any clear
explanation for this result but it is worth mentioning that there is no clear link
between pro-market reforms and inflation and hence we do not have a prior
on the correlation between inflation and support for reform.
Interestingly, unemployment is not statistically significant when all the
macro variables are entered in the same regression.18 Besides being statistically
significant, our results suggest that macroeconomic variables play an important
16 Results for PRICES and PRIVPROD are not reported for conciseness. They are similar
(although weaker) to those for PRIVAT and MARKET.
17 Depth of crisis yields results similar to unemployment. We use lagged values because the
Latinobarómetro surveys are collected in the middle of the year and the macroeconomic
variables measure yearly flows or averages. For example, in order to explain support for
reforms in June 2001 we think that it is more appropriate to use GDP growth over the
January 2000-January 2001 period rather than GDP growth over the January 2001-January
2002 period. All the regressions are estimated using country fixed effects and by clustering
the standard errors in order to control for the fact that macroeconomic variables have no
within country-year variation.
18 One possible explanation for this could be the fact that official unemployment rates do




















































Table 7. Macroeconomic Factors and Support for Reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PRIVAT PRIVAT PRIVAT PRIVAT MARKET MARKET MARKET MARKET
AGE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.82) (0.57) (0.80) (0.52) (1.19) (1.31) (1.19) (1.31)
SEX -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(2.57) ** (2.61) *** (2.57) ** (2.60) *** (2.14) ** (1.97) ** (2.18) ** (1.98) **
quintile==2 -0.018 -0.011 -0.018 -0.010 -0.011 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004
(2.23) ** (1.59) (2.21) ** (1.54) (0.96) (0.37) (0.92) (0.36)
quintile==3 -0.014 -0.006 -0.016 -0.004 0.018 0.023 0.018 0.024
(1.41) (0.66) (1.56) (0.45) (1.24) (1.55) (1.26) (1.59)
quintile==4 -0.004 0.006 -0.005 0.007 0.016 0.024 0.017 0.024
(0.40) (0.71) (0.47) (0.84) (1.30) (1.86) * (1.31) (1.87) *
quintile==5 0.041 0.052 0.038 0.055 0.035 0.044 0.036 0.044
(2.69) *** (3.71) *** (2.55) ** (4.07) *** (2.16) ** (2.49) ** (2.19) ** (2.52) **
HAPPY 0.396 0.378 0.414 0.361 0.212 0.230 0.223 0.235
(8.02) *** (6.64) *** (8.16) *** (7.02) *** (4.03) *** (3.93) *** (4.45) *** (4.08) ***
Output gap 0.011 0.013 0.008 -0.002






























Unemployment -0.020 0.001 -0.014 -0.015
(2.72) *** (0.08) (2.96) *** (1.57)
Inflation 0.370 0.536 0.669 0.389
(1.24) (3.85) *** (1.62) (1.31)
Constant 0.170 0.375 0.129 0.119 0.576 0.702 0.515 0.670
(4.90) *** (4.13) *** (2.73) *** (0.88) (16.44) *** (11.57) *** (9.45) *** (5.18) ***
Observations 64,986 57,927 64,986 57,927 30,395 26,795 30,395 26,795
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Notes: All the equations are estimated using a linear probability model and include country fixed effects and country-year clustered standard errors.
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 7. (Continued) Macroeconomic Factors and Support for Reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PRIVAT PRIVAT PRIVAT PRIVAT MARKET MARKET MARKET MARKET23 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
role in explaining attitude towards reforms. Let us look, for instance, at the
relationship between the output gap and the support for privatization (which,
during the 1998-2003 period, went from 52 to 25 percent). Average output
gap was 3 percent in 1997 and -3 percent in 2002 (a change of 6 percentage
points). By multiplying 6 by the estimated coefficient (0.011), we obtain 0.066
(6.6 percent), which is close to one third of the total drop in support for reforms.
The case of Argentina is a striking example of the importance of
macroeconomic factors. In Argentina, the output gap went from 7 percent in
1997 to -14 percent in 2002. By itself, this explains a drop in support for
privatization equivalent to 23 percentage points, which is about 80 percent of
the observed drop in support for privatization in Argentina (which fell from
45 to 13 percent). While Argentina fits our story perfectly, it is important to
point out that the results of Table 7 are not driven by the behavior of Argentina.
If we re-estimate the equations of Table 7 by either dropping all observations
for Argentina or by just dropping Argentina for 2003, we obtain identical
results.
Our findings contrast slightly with those of Pernice and Sturzenegger
(2003). Although they find that high unemployment was a reason for the
decline in support for pro-market reforms (a finding that is consistent with
our thesis that the rejection of reforms was linked to a decrease in the level of
economic security), they find that support for reforms was already declining
while growth was still high. A possible explanation for this finding is that
income distribution did not improve during the period of high economic growth
(it actually deteriorated, see Cabrol et al., 2003), and that for some
Argentineans the economic boom was accompanied by an increase of
economic insecurity (this is consistent with the high level of the unemployment
rate). In fact, Gasparini and Sosa Escudero (2001) find that there is a class of
welfare functions that indicate that in Argentina social welfare deteriorated
over the 1994-1998 period.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we use data from opinion polls to document discontent with
pro-market reforms among Latin Americans and explore four possible
explanations for this discontent. We find support for the simplest and most24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
intuitive explanation: the backlash against reforms is mostly explained by the
recent collapse in economic activity. There are several possible interpretations
of our result.
A first interpretation is that what matters is the difference between
expectations and actual outcome. Policymakers may have made the mistake
of overselling the reforms by promising too much, and the disillusionment
with reforms documented in this paper could be due to unmet expectations.
While we have no way to control for the role of expectations, a recent study
shows that rejection of pro-market reforms is also prevalent in some fast-
growing Eastern European countries and argues that this rejection might be
due to excessive expectations.19 If we project this situation onto Latin America,
it is easy to understand the strong rejection of reforms once the economic
indicators turned out to be negative, rather than less positive than expected.
A second interpretation has to do with the fact that the current economic
crisis happened after a period of intense reforms (Lora and Panizza, 2003)
and those who now oppose reforms might believe that there is a causal
relationship between the reform process and the economic crisis. If this were
the case, the finding that rejection of reforms is due primarily to poor economic
outcomes carries a number of different implications, depending on the causes
of the recent economic crisis. If the crisis were indeed due to the fact that the
reform process increased volatility and contributed to economic instability
(as some reform opponents think), then those who oppose reforms are right
and the change in opinion registered by the survey is a healthy phenomenon,
in which citizens rejected something that did not work. However, if the crisis
were mostly due to external shocks and international contagion (Calvo, 2002),
then those who oppose reforms would make the mistake of giving a causal
interpretation to a spurious correlation. There is, in fact, some evidence that
this may be the case. Birdsall and de la Torre (2001) suggest that, while not
fully successful, the process of structural reforms played a positive role in
limiting the damaging effect of the large external shock that hit Latin America
in the late 1990s.
A final interpretation has to do with the perceived fairness of the capitalist
system. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) find that residents of poor countries
tend to be less pro-market than residents of industrial countries and argue
19 See The Economist, “Never Had It So Good,” September 11, 2003.25 WHY ARE LATIN AMERICANS SO UNHAPPY ABOUT REFORMS?
that this is due to the presence of widespread corruption that reduces the
perceived fairness of the capitalist system. If one assumes that the economic
crisis amplified the anti-capitalist bias that characterizes most developing
countries, then our results are fully in line with the findings of Di Tella and
MacCulloch (2004).20
Appendix
Table A1. Definitions of Variables
  Variable                               Question       Scale
PRIVAT Has the privatization of public sector 1 = agree
companies been beneficial for the country? 0 = disagree
MARKET Are you satisfied, more than satisfied, not very 1 = satisfied
satisfied or unsatisfied with the functioning of 0 = not satisfied
the market economy?
PRICES Should the free market determine the price of 1 = yes
products? 0 = no
PRIVPROD Should the state leave productive 1 = yes
activities to the private sector? 0 = no
LACINT Are you in favor or opposed to the economic 1 = favor
integration of the Latin American countries? 0 = oppose
FDI Do you think that FDI is, in general, 1 = beneficial
beneficial or harmful for the country’s 0 = harmful
economic development?
IDENTPP How do you feel about political parties: very 1 = not close
close, quite close, only sympathetic, not close 2 = only
to any political party? sympathetic
3 = quite close
4 = very close
20 However, while we find that those who think that corruption is a serious problem tend to
be more critical of pro-market reforms, we do not find any evidence for the idea that
perception of corruption has increased during the economic crisis.26 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
CONFIPP How much confidence do you have in each 1 = none
of these institutions: church, police, television, 2 = few
political parties, judiciary system, 3 = some
national congress and armed forces? 4 = a lot
TR_CON Would you say you have a lot, some, few or 1 = a lot
no confidence in the National 2 = some
Congress/Parliament? 3 = few
4 = none
TR_PRES Would you say you have a lot, some, few or 1 = a lot
no confidence in the President? 2 = some
3 = few
4 = none
RIGHTWING On a political scale, where 0 is left and 10 0 = left
is right, where would you be located? 10 = right
CORR Thinking about the problem of corruption 1 = very serious
today, would you say it’s a very serious, 0 = not serious
serious, not very serious or not serious problem?
CONN Do you think that connections are more 2 = definitely,
important than hard work? 1 = yes, 0 = no
CL_EL In general, do you think that elections in 1 = clean
this country are clean or fraudulent? 0 = fraudulent
HAPPY HAPPY was created as the principal 1 = happy
component of three questions: In general, 0 = unhappy
would you say you are satisfied with your life?
1 = very satisfied, 4 = not satisfied; how would
you, in general, qualify your and your family’s
present economic situation? 1 = very good
5 = very bad; in the next 12 months, do you
think that your and your family’s economic
situation will be much better, better,
the same, worse or much worse?
1 = much better, 5 = much worse.
Table A1. (Continued) Definitions of Variables



















































Table A2. Correlation Matrix




PRIVAT 0.0500 0.1386 1
(0.00) (0.00)
MARKET 0.0881 0.1515 0.2655 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRICES 0.0621 0.0768 0.2267 0.3727 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRIVPROD 0.0516 0.1342 0.3067 0.1868 0.2733 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IDENTPP 0.0228 N/A 0.0342 N/A N/A N/A 1
(0.00) --- (0.00) --- --- ---
CONFIPP 0.0186 0.0036 0.1185 0.0181 0.0281 0.0398 0.2607 1
(0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: p-values in parentheses.28 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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